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Article 10

TO SEE THE EARTH
AS OTHER
John Corso Esquivel
The Ethics of Earth Art by
Amanda Boetzkes. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press,
2010. Pp. 248. $75.00 cloth, $25.00
paper.

Assembling a powerful corpus
of research and theory, Amanda
Boetzkes argues in The Ethics of
Earth Art that earth art provides a
sensible surface upon which subjects can form an ethical relationship to the earth based on its radical
alterity to the body. Boetzkes’s book
is of major importance to artists,
historians, and ecophilosophers,
but its methodology and dense
academic presentation make such
strenuous demands that I consider
the workings of this ethical relationship to be far from settled.
Boetzkes begins by defining
an ecological stance as that which
“involves revealing the limits of
an anthropocentric worldview and
recognizing these limits as thresholds to the excess of the earth” (3).
Ecological ethics commonly revolve
around human ecology; Boetzkes
quickly separates her project from
anthropocentric ethics, focusing
instead on the place where “nature
exceeds the scope of human knowledge and systems of representation” (3). Boetzkes notes that, since
the 1960s, artists have initiated an
ethical engagement with the earth
and its ecology to offer a surface
upon which viewers can access the
“elemental.” The artwork reveals
how elementals overwhelm the
senses, “and specifically how nature
troubles representational form” (4).
The simultaneous aesthetic excess
and withdrawal from representation create “the conditions of possibility for the earth to appear at
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the limits of intelligible form and to
deliver a sense of it at the point at
which it overflows the field of perception” (4). The perceiver is thus
put into a relationship with the
earth that Boetzkes will characterize as marked by recessive ethics (4).
Defined as “a stance of retraction from and receptivity to the
earth,” the recessive ethics that
figure in contemporary art combat two misguided relationships
towards the earth (4). According to
the “instrumental view,” humans
mine the earth’s resources strictly
to reproduce an anthropocentric
hegemony. Equally problematic,
the “romantic view” imagines a
“return to a state of unencumbered
continuity with nature” (4). The
encounter with earth art frustrates
both instrumental and romantic views by proffering an already
withdrawn earth. As a recessive
other, the earth’s relationship to
the artgoer is likened to the ethical relationship between a subject
and his sexual other, which Luce
Irigaray outlines in An Ethics of
Sexual Difference (1993). Boetzkes
identifies two characteristics of
Irigaray’s ethics of difference as
particularly important to the ethics of earth art. Irigaray’s ethics
are driven by a problematic that
is born only when one recognizes
the other’s sexual difference and
ponders their irreducible, interstitial distance. Crucial to this recognition is the physical encounter
with the other, through which both

subjects open into and onto the
other, “through an open and receptive mode of touch that does not
attempt to enclose but reinforces
the parameters of difference” (21).
Earth art, Boetzkes argues, provides a medium through which the
human subject develops a similar
ethical position by sensing the radical otherness of the earth.
Fundamental to Boetzkes’s
project is John Sallis’s philosophy of
the elemental. Boetzkes interprets
the elemental as “irreducible”: “An
elemental cannot be analyzed by
dividing it into constituent parts,
nor can it be summarized as a single
entity” (15). Unable to “deliver [an
elemental’s] sensual fullness” (20),
contemporary artists struggle “to
make the earth visible” (18) while
revealing “its resistance to signification” (18). Boetzkes, therefore,
distinguishes between the earth (for
Edmund Husserl, the Ur-Arche),
which defies representability, and
the linguistically, culturally, and
historically inscribed world.
Chapter 2 submits Robert
Smithson’s work as evidence that
earth art insists on the unrepresentability of the site. Boetzkes
draws attention to the way that
Smithson’s Spiral Jetty (1970), an
artwork that exists in diverse documentary and material forms, conjoins vision and language. To do so,
she retraces the arguments of Craig
Owens’s influential essay, in which
the latter argued that the totality
of Spiral Jetty always exceeds any
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single documentary record (e.g.,
a photograph or a film). Owens
determines that the work exists
allegorically, with narratives retrospectively supplementing the limits of any one particular document.
Unlike Owens, Boetzkes does
not focus on the space or distance
between the site and its discursive
supplements. Rather, she insists
that the “gaps in signification that
occur between the texts” serve to
make the site’s unrepresentability
(the “empty center in the artwork”)
its ethical purpose: “The statement
is not just that the site is absent
but that its totality is not, and
never was, possible” (72). Crucial
to Boetzkes’s understanding of
Spiral Jetty is her belief that textuality does not render phenomenal
experience unnecessary. On the
contrary, the physical encounter
with elementals plays a constitutive role in establishing the ethical
relationship. By overwhelming the
senses, elementals remind the subject of the earth’s irreducibility and,
therefore, of its otherness. This
does not distance the site through
allegory, but recovers for the site its
real fullness (91). Bringing earth,
water, and light together achieves
for Boetzkes an “intertwining of
elementals,” and “[t]hrough this
overlap of elementals, Spiral Jetty
demonstrates the earth’s impenetrability and its resistance to unification of form and meaning” (101).
Chapter 3 more thoroughly
revisits the earth as “elemental.”
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Boetzkes writes, “To posit the earth
as elemental is to insist on its irreducibility to the human world and
to distinguish it from a bounded
and intelligible thing” (102). Since
elementals are boundless, they are
not intelligible; they are nevertheless sensible (102). As a result, the
elemental earth raises the ethical
opportunity “for a reconceptualization of the earth itself and of our
position in relation to it” (103).
Turning to Martin Heidegger
and Jean-Luc Nancy, Boetzkes
investigates the ways that humans
define the earth in terms of its natural resources.1 She invokes Nancy’s
term, “ecotechnology,” to remind
us that “the discourses that frame
nature are inseparable from a set
of technological conditions that are
produced for us and by us” (104).
(Nancy developed the term to qualify Foucault’s contention that, from
the eighteenth century, political
regimes exercised power over institutions related to the preservation
of the organism and the species.2
Nancy clarified that “biopolitics”
became possible only because of the
scientific ability to automanage life
through technology, what he called
“ecotechnology.”3) Boetzkes states,
“Thus, ecotechnology exposes the
earth as resource, but it also brings
forth the idea of nature, or the
‘truth’ of the elemental earth” (104).
This leads Boetzkes to agree with
Sallis that “the turn to the elemental is not a move ‘back to nature,’”
but a turn towards that which
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exceeds the instrumentally conditioned frame of nature (104).
Artists like James Turrell, Chris
Drury, and Olafur Eliasson create
the opportunity to sense the elemental and thus to look at the face of the
earth beyond ecotechnological constraints. These artists “use the artwork to articulate an involution in,
and a turn to face, the earth in order
to extricate the spectator from the
presumed continuity between the
body and ‘nature’” (105). Boetzkes
continues, “That is to say, by presenting the elemental as a surface,
contemporary artists open contact
with the Earth’s alterity” (107).
The final half of the book examines what it means to face the earth
ethically, emphasizing the fundamental role of alterity in that relationship. Boetzkes follows Irigaray,
who repeatedly faults Maurice
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology
for maintaining a bodily continuity with the world; this narcissistic continuity prevents the subject
from recognizing its other, consequently inhibiting meaningful ethical thought. Boetzkes explains, “All
sensation becomes translated into
‘Sameness’ and merely fulfills one’s
perceptual expectations, so that no
true understanding of difference
can register” (108). For Irigaray,
the recognition of the other is the
requisite precondition that allows a
subject to ask after the well-being
of another. Without differentiation, the subject remains sutured
to a solipsistic world, incapable of

empathy because he cannot recognize the existence of others.
Ultimately, Boetzkes argues that
earth art positions the subject “at
the very site where elementals
meet, overlap, and drawback from
one another” (115). The elemental
“overflows” establish the relationship between the subject and the
excessive earth as analogous to
Irigaray’s relationship between ethical subject (constituted as male in
Western philosophy) and his feminine other as constituted through
an irreducible sexual difference.
Irigaray understands that sexual
difference exists in registers beyond
the strictly visual, and she posits a
central role for tactility in recognizing the other. Likewise, Boetzkes
extends this tactility to the earth art
encounter:
[T]he entanglement of tactility and vision are key to the
ethical paradigm of earth
art. These senses are each
provoked, suspended, and
reestablished through one
another, as a means of eliciting a “facing” of the earth. . . .
Though the body is located
in a network of natural activity, then, the artworks instigate an involution or turn
against the earth in order
to gain a perspective of it as
other. (147)
This point of contact constitutes
the defining (and deconstructive)
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limit against which the ethical
relationship is forged. In her discussions of Ana Mendieta, Jackie
Brookner, and Ichi Ikeda, among
others, Boetzkes concludes that
this “understanding of the artwork
as founded on a sensorial encounter implies that the earth is not just
the material of the artwork, or
even its catalyst, but an unfathomable presence engaged in a kind
of quasi-intersubjective exchange
with the artist. . . . The artwork
entails a facing of the earth as a
radical other, not as a human subject” (160, my emphasis).
While I greatly admire the
aims of this project, I am concerned about the overall approach
to methodology, an approach that
I can only understand as a kind of
bricolage. It is not that Boetzkes
borrows theories from such an
extensive roster of diverse, often
antithetical philosophers that elicits alarm. Rather, in the bricolage
forms these philosophies assume
in her monograph, aspects that I
consider to be essential components
of the original are often missing or
at least unnoticeable in Boetzkes’s
deployment. I will focus here on
one example: the disappearance
of sex from Irigaray’s ethics of
difference.4
What is missing in Boetzkes’s
application (though not her discussion) of an ethics of sexual difference to the ethics of earth art
is the irreplaceable centrality of
sexual difference. To avoid the
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anthropocentrism
characteristic
of an ecotechnological stance,
Boetzkes insists that the earth is constituted as radically other—that is,
“not as a human subject.” Irigaray’s
ethics are necessarily anthropomorphic and are also theorized around
specific sexual difference. It is precisely sexual difference (rather
than gender difference or abstract
“Otherness”) that makes Irigaray’s
ethics so complex, contentious, and
revolutionary. Judith Butler notes
that what is often identified as sexual essentialism in Irigaray’s work
might actually form one of its most
potent challenges to masculinist
philosophy: “[I]t’s clear to me that
sexual difference does not denote a
simple opposition, a binary opposition. What it denotes is something
like the relationship of a presumed
masculine symbolic order to what
it must exclude and how that same
presumed masculine order requires
this excluded feminine to augment
and reproduce itself.”5 Drucilla
Cornell confirms the constitutive
role of the feminine for Irigaray’s
ethics:
If anything, the feminine
was a kind of radical otherness to any conception of the
real or reality. More than
anything else, here I found
someone who was deploying
the feminine unashamedly
in a utopian manner, saying that there is a beyond to
whatever kind of concept of
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sense we have. And without
that beyond being articulated, endlessly breaking up
the real, we can’t even get to
a different kind of ethics. I
saw her as creating openings,
not just a feminist ethics, but
an ethics in which the feminine within sexual difference
was crucial to a complete
rethinking of the ethical.6
I understand that even considering
the figure of Mother Earth introduces what could be construed as
anthropocentric essentialism, but
Butler urges us to consider essentialism more deeply: “But still it’s
very interesting that essentialism
has been collapsed with categories
that describe adequately when, in
fact, what an essence is is something
that is always escaping the domain
of appearance.”7 Maintaining an
interest in the feminine earth need
not replicate a restrictive cliché; it
may actually work in consonance
with Boetzkes’s recessive ethics.
By desexing the earth, The Ethics
of Earth Art denies the utopian
dimension of Irigaray’s ethics. The
book also denies the feminine its
potential as a viable alternative to
the unmarked patriarchy normalized in most ecophilosophy.
Desexing the ethics of earth art
threatens further consequences: it
masks the fundamental heterocentrism that is more readily apparent
in Irigaray’s ethics. Butler worries
about the extreme heterocentrism

of An Ethics of Sexual Difference,
which “is all about mom and motherhood and not at all about postfamily arrangements or alternative
family arrangements.”8 For Butler,
Irigaray
not only brought to the fore
a kind of presumptive heterosexuality, but actually
made heterosexuality into
the privileged locus of ethics,
as if heterosexual 
relations,
because they putatively
crossed this alterity, which is
the alterity of sexual difference, were somehow more
ethical, more other-directed,
less narcissistic than a nything
else.9
This heterocentrism persists in the
ethics of earth art, which similarly
privileges the intact surface of difference between subject and the
earth as the locus of the ethical
encounter. Butler continues, “And
I would say that what [Irigaray]
has done has completely obliterated the way in which an ethically enabling difference exists in
homosexual love.”10 Boetzkes has
brought together a provocative
combination of phenomenological and deconstructive texts that,
as Cornell says of Irigaray, creates
openings in which we may completely rethink our relationship to
the earth. This book initiates what
will surely continue as a lively,
unsettled debate over our ethical
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stance towards the earth. In future
discussions, Drucilla Cornell’s
Philosophy of the Limit (1992)
may provide a valuable direction. Cornell shows that Jacques
Derrida’s philosophy of reading
allows us to rethink the ethics of
difference. Rather than facing the
earth, “reading” the Earth may
provide a fruitful avenue through
which an ethics of earth art that
attends to sameness and difference, presence and absence, might
be discerned.
John Corso Esquivel is the Doris and Paul
Travis Associate Professor of Art History at
Oakland University in Rochester, Michigan.
His writings have appeared in the Bulletin
of the Detroit Institute of the Arts,
Mosaic, RACAR, Brooklyn Rail, ART21
Magazine, and Art Papers. His book,
Feminist Subjectivities in Fiber Art and
Craft: Shadows of Affect, is under contract
with Routledge and will appear as part of
the Research in Gender and Art series.

NOTES
1. It seems, though, that any instrumentally conceived earth is not appropriately called “earth,” but perhaps
“world.”
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2. Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the
World or Globalization (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2007),
93–95. Unfortunately, the central role
of politics and power in Nancy’s text
remains unacknowledged in Boetzkes’s
discussion.
3. Ibid.
4. I would like to comment also on
Boetzkes’s extraction of the elemental
from Sallis’s complex philosophy but
am unqualified to do so at length. I
suspect that excising the elemental from
the complex network of ideas such as
the tractive imagination, the monstrous,
and the exorbitant does something to
the relationality of that term (see John
Sallis, Force of Imagination, Studies in
Continental Thought [Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2000]). Since
Sallis himself considers the relationship
of art to the earth, I wonder whether
The Ethics of Earth Art could have been
more convincingly staged from within
Sallis’s paradigm.
5. Pheng Cheah and Elizabeth
Grosz, “The Future of Sexual
Difference: An Interview with Judith
Butler and Drucilla Cornell,” Diacritics
28, no. 1 (1998): 19–42, quotation on 27.
6. Ibid., 20.
7. Ibid., 22.
8. Ibid., 28.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

